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Abstract 
We study the theoretical and empirical links between fiscal policy and spatial inequality, with a 
non-exclusive focus on Latin American countries.  We outline the two main dimensions of fiscal 
policy vis-à-vis economic inequality, and show how these can be used to analyze specific policy 
measures.  We examine why fiscal policies so often fail to have the ameliorative effects that theory 
predicts on spatial inequality, and explore ways to make policy tools more effective.  We explore 
the relation between fiscal policies and spatial inequalities in three case studies: Mexico, Brazil and 
Argentina.  Lastly, we examine the effects of decentralization on spatial inequality in Bolivia. 
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1. Introduction 
Numerous studies have noted the growing problem of inequality amongst individuals and 
across regions.  Such is the prevalence of inequality that many have christened it a defining 
characteristic of our age, affecting developed and developing countries alike, including economies 
as diverse as China, the United States and South Africa.  Researchers have attempted to link this 
phenomenon to causes as diverse as trade liberalization, the rise of the information economy, 
increasing “superstar” behavior in product and labor markets, and “neoliberal” policies that pare 
back the welfare state.  Because such theoretical arguments are characterized by their breadth of 
scope and richness of institutional setting, they are intrinsically difficult to estimate 
econometrically, and hence to resolve with convincing empirical evidence. 
This paper examines the links between inequality and fiscal policy.  Our main focus is on 
the potential of fiscal policy to redistribute resources in a way that ameliorates inequality.  This 
narrow focus is justified because whatever the cause of a society’s inequality, fiscal policy is one of 
the most powerful tools available for combating its ill effects.  Indeed, in many cases fiscal policy 
can go further, and help overcome the factors that caused inequality in the first place.  But we also 
examine the extent to which fiscal policy creates inequality.  That is to say, we examine fiscal 
policy as both a cure for inequality, and its cause.   
Our empirical focus is on the experience of Latin American countries.  There are two 
reasons for this: (i) Latin America suffers an unusually high degree of inequality, and hence the 
problem is disproportionately pressing there; and (ii) a number of Latin American countries enjoy 
sophisticated public information bureaucracies that produce a steady stream of high-quality data on 
a wide range of economic and social characteristics, facilitating the study of inequality there.  We 
supplement this regional focus with evidence from the wider world on points that are particularly 
compelling in their own right, or that complement the Latin American experience. 
Such complementing is necessary because of the unfortunate lack of empirical evidence on 
the effects of fiscal policy on inequality in Latin America.  Indeed, the broader empirical literature 
on fiscal policy and spatial inequality – including both developing and developed countries – is 
surprisingly small.  Among others, Kim (2008) notes that “the literature does not provide a guide on 
defining a list of specific policy recommendations for reducing ‘excessive’ spatial inequality or 
increasing ‘beneficial’ spatial inequality” (p.35).  For this reason, we focus on the two Latin 
American countries for which most evidence is available – Mexico and Brazil, and supplement this 
with a discussion of the most important fiscal instruments in use in Argentina, and how these have 
changed over the past few decades. 
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Inequality can be studied at two levels: the interpersonal level (within-group inequality), and 
the spatial level (between-group inequality). While both forms are important, this paper focuses on 
the latter. The significance of spatial inequality lies in both its empirical and theoretical aspects.  Its 
empirical importance becomes quickly self-evident when one reviews summary evidence: spatial 
inequality is present in all countries, and in some reaches surprisingly high levels.  Figure 1a shows 
inequality across Latin America, while figure 1b compares Latin American inequality with that of 
other regions.  Figure 1b shows that inequality is systematically higher in Latin American countries 
than in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, South 
Asia, or Europe and Central Asia.  It is worth noting that the Gini coefficient is on the vertical axis, 
and hence differences across regions that may appear modest at fist glance are actually quite large.  
Figure 1a shows inequality across Latin American countries in more detail.  We can observe that 
inequality across the region varies from Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana, which boast European 
levels, to Bolivia and Haiti, which suffer some of the highest levels of inequality in the world. 
Figure 1: Spatial Inequality Across Countries 
 
 Source: Lopez and Perry(2008)   
 
If such stylized facts are insufficiently persuasive of the importance of spatial inequality, 
consider its theoretical importance.  High levels of spatial inequality can produce resentment 
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between regions. This is especially true when spatial disparities coincide with ethnic, religious or 
political cleavages. Left unattended, spatial inequality can have serious consequences for the 
stability of a country, and in extreme cases may lead to national disintegration (see Shanker and 
Shah 2003, amongst others).  In Latin America, Bolivia presents a clear case of the convergence of 
high levels of spatial inequality with geographic, ethnic, and political cleavages, and differences in 
natural resource endowments.  The confluence of all of these factors has led to very high levels of 
political instability over the past decade, including the toppling of two presidents and the collapse of 
the entire political party system.  We return to the case of Bolivia below. 
What is spatial inequality? 
Before proceeding, it is important to define what exactly we mean by ‘spatial inequality’.  
Following Kanbur and Venables (2005), we define spatial inequality as a disparity in well-being 
due to discrepancies in social and economic factors across geography. ‘Across geography’ can 
mean areas as large (and far apart) as continents, or as small (and close together) as neighborhoods. 
While we recognize that inequality across countries is important, for the purposes of this paper we 
confine our analysis to inequality within countries. This restriction enables us to study policies used 
by central and decentralized government to try to reduce inequality. 
Within a country, spatial inequality can exist at many levels: between states, provinces and 
districts, between rural and urban areas, between cities, and amongst neighborhoods. While we 
acknowledge the importance of all levels of spatial inequality within a country, we address all but 
neighborhood inequality here. This is because the neighborhood is typically too low an 
administrative level for central governments to formulate effective policies regarding inequality 
(Lall and Chakravorty 2005). Additionally, the complexity of the solutions required for many such 
problems is daunting, especially where big-city slums are involved. Slums are areas which have 
little access to public services, and often have no property or tenancy rights (many inhabitants are 
squatters). UN-Habitat (2006) estimate that 31.6% of the world’s urban population lives in slums. 
Although the problem of slums is in no sense trivial, policy solutions – slum upgrading and 
property titling – are complex policy prescriptions that can lead to the creation of perverse 
incentives.  It is our view that the complexity of the problem, and the specificity of likely solutions, 
justify addressing neighborhood inequality separately, and not in conjunction with the other 
categories surveyed here. 
This paper examines the role of fiscal policy in exacerbating spatial inequality, and – more 
importantly – its role in counteracting the causes of inequality, or ameliorating its effects.  We 
examine the various strategies and policy tools Latin American countries have used to reduce 
inequality, focusing especially on the cases of Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia.  We try to 
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ascertain why some countries’ efforts have met with significant success, while others’ have not.  
We do this by first examining the theoretical links between fiscal policy and spatial inequality in 
Latin America and further afield in section 2.  Section 3 examines empirical evidence for the 
existence or not of such linkages across a broad range of countries.  In view of the Latin American 
emphasis that dominates the rest of the paper, we take advantage of this section to review evidence 
from the rest of the world.  Sections 4 and 5 examine the experiences of two countries – Mexico and 
Brazil – in much more detail, focusing on the shifting blend of policies each country has used over 
time to decrease inequality, and trying to identify their effects.  Section 6 examines the current 
blend of fiscal policies in use in Argentina, and how these have changed over recent decades.  
Although evidence on their effects on inequality is much scarcer than for the other two countries, 
we try to form a view based on related, incomplete evidence.  Finally we turn away from specific 
policies in section 7, to the more general reorganization of government powers, responsibilities and 
incentives that decentralization implies, and ask the question: Can decentralization lead to a greater 
equality of opportunities and welfare across space?  We explore the ways in which this might come 
about, and then whether or not it does in fact, through the case study of Bolivia’s 1994 
decentralization.  Section 8 concludes. 
2. Theory: Fiscal policy as cause and consequence of spatial inequality 
Fiscal policy makes use of two tools to attempt to minimize spatial differences in income 
and welfare: taxes and public expenditures. Taxes, as long as they are progressive, take resources 
away from the rich and place them in the government pool. These taxes are used by government to 
either provide subsidies – including direct cash transfers – or provide citizens with public goods and 
services. While taxes and subsidies lead to a direct redistribution, public spending is both a direct 
and indirect way of reducing spatial inequality. The direct effect of public investment is through 
building human capital and improving the quality of living. The indirect effect is to create an 
environment conducive to private investment. Such an environment can promote job creation, and 
help bring economic improvement to a region, thus narrowing the gap between regions.  
Public spending can be classified according to two broad (and overlapping) dimensions. These 
are:  
• Universality: The extent to which public goods and services are targeted to specific, 
identifiable groups or individuals, or provided universally to all citizens. 
• Connectivity: The extent to which public goods and services provide benefits within a 
specific community, or across different communities by facilitating the movement of people 
and ideas. 
 5
As the name suggests, targeted spending can be delivered directly at the household or even 
individual level, allowing the exclusion of others. Conditional cash transfers (CCT) and 
scholarships are examples of highly targeted public expenditures with low universality. Universal 
spending, on the other hand, transcends the individual and household, as it is not possible to exclude 
people from its benefits.  Education, health care, and roads are examples of public expenditures 
with high universality. 
With respect to the second dimension – connectivity – many public goods and services 
produce benefits that are largely specific to a particular geographic space (be that a city, 
municipality or state).  Individuals who have benefited from such expenditures may move 
elsewhere, taking some or all of these benefits with them.  But the benefits themselves are spatially 
static, not transcending geography unless the individuals who carry them do.  Examples of such 
expenditures include public education, health care, and irrigation.  By contrast, the very nature of 
some public goods and services is to link different communities, regions or states.  Such goods 
operate by transcending spatial boundaries and facilitating the circulation of people and ideas 
amongst different geographical units.  Examples include roads, the postal service, telephone and 
data networks, television, radio, railroads, and scholarships. 
The degree of universality of public services is particularly relevant when addressing 
problems of interpersonal inequality.  Where the problem is highly specific, and the beneficiaries 
are easily identifiable, then targeted policies can be highly effective in reducing inequality.  If the 
needy population is dispersed or difficult to identify, then universal goods may be a more feasible 
or cost-effective way of leveling the extremes of a population upwards. 
Likewise, the degree of connectivity of public services is particularly relevant for addressing 
problems of spatial inequality.  Where spatial inequality is the result of variations in the stock of 
infrastructure or public assets, locally-specific investments can be an effective response.  But where 
inequality results from differential access to markets, or to a particular resource (e.g. a natural 
resource, or knowledge and information), then expenditures in connectivity-type goods can be the 
best way to overcome inequality. 
This reasoning is offered as very general observations designed to help us think about the 
links between types of policies and types of inequality.  They are not meant as “rules” of any sort.  
This is not least because the types of public expenditures that should be used to address particular 
problems of inequality should vary first and foremost according to the underlying causes of the 
inequality in question, and secondly according to contextual parameters of the country in question. 
We can use these two dimensions to build a simple 2x2 matrix into which we can map most 
of the fiscal policies relevant for issues of inequality, as follows: 
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     Interpersonal Inequality 
 Targeted Universal 
 
 Locally-specific  
 
Spatial Inequality 
 
 Connective  
 
 
 
The matrix makes the further point that the two dimensions are inseparable. Policy action cannot be 
taken in, say, the connectivity dimension only. Hence attempts to counteract spatial inequality will 
inevitably affect interpersonal inequality as well, and vice versa. The choice of which type of 
inequality to address in isolation is not available. 
Economic theory implies that fiscal policy is not only a solution to regional inequality, but 
can be a cause of it as well. This occurs when governments favor certain regions over others, 
allowing the former to accumulate wealth more rapidly, as occurred in Mexico (see below). Once 
this has occurred, reverting to a policy stance that is merely neutral may not be sufficient to level 
incomes and welfare. Active redistribution to poorer regions, plus a progressive investment profile 
that prioritizes deprived regions, may be called for. Examples of specific policies that can 
exacerbate inequality are regressive taxes, and non-compensating fiscal transfers, when regions rely 
mostly on their own resources, with minimal transfers from the federal government. 
Fiscal policy often faces a trade-off between equity and efficiency. A small number of 
policies, including notably conditional cash transfers, can achieve both goals at once by extending 
and improving the operation of markets.  But for most policy options, it is the case that some tend 
promote growth and efficiency, while others tend to reduce inequality. For instance, tax holidays on 
investments can lead to higher growth rates. Subsidies on industrial inputs should also enhance 
industrial growth. However, such tax breaks and subsidies tend to be centered on urban and 
industrial areas, which already benefit from high levels of government spending. Conversely, 
policies such as progressive taxes and subsidies on food and basic needs (which usually claim most 
of a poor household’s income) can be used to minimize inequality. These send resources into the 
countryside and can help poorer regions catch up. 
The decision of whether to pursue a pro-efficiency or pro-equity approach is made harder by 
the presence of strong arguments in favor of both. On the efficiency side, authors argue that 
Conditional Cash 
Transfers 
 
Health 
Education 
Sanitation 
Water 
Scholarships Roads 
Railroads 
Postal service 
Telecommunications 
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governments should focus their resources on areas likely to have the highest returns (De la Fuente 
and Vives 1995, Rodriguez-Oreggia and Roriguez-Pose 2004). This is expected to increase the 
economic pie and eventually benefit the economy at large (including the poor). On the equity side, 
many argue that it is unacceptable to have certain regions in the country unequally provided for just 
because of their location, and that inequality can reduce growth by fomenting political unrest, and 
because economically useful resources are in effect left untapped (Barro 2000, Persson and 
Tabellini 1994, Rodriguez-Oreggia and Roriguez-Pose 2004). 
Attempts to measure this tradeoff directly have tended to confirm the findings of theory.  
Martin (1999) and Baldwin (2003), for example, show that improving the infrastructure of poor 
regions can attenuate industrial concentration in richer regions, but at the cost of slowing economic 
growth in the nation as a whole.  Alonso (2001), on the other hand, warns that such findings might 
not hold if congestion in infrastructure use, which counteracts centripetal economies of scale and 
agglomeration, is taken into account. 
3. Fiscal policy and inequality: cross-country evidence 
Are these theoretical links borne out by data?  How strong is the evidence that fiscal policy 
causes spatial inequality?  How strong is the evidence that fiscal policy can reduce it? Empirical 
studies draw a clear link between high levels of spatial inequality and skewed public goods 
provision, pointing to the importance of fiscal policy in creating the underlying differences in 
endowments, knowledge and productive assets that cause spatial disparities to arise.  Empirical 
research also points to the ability of fiscal policies to reduce existing inequality, or counteract the 
factors that cause inequality.  But the evidence on this last point is much more mixed and 
ambiguous, with many studies finding that fiscal policies intended to reduce inequality have no 
effect, and some finding that such policies actually worsen inequality. 
 We begin with fiscal policy’s role in producing inequality in Latin America, a region that is 
understandably prominent in this literature.  In a study of Peruvian districts, Escobal and Torero 
(2003) find that the incidence of poverty in districts at sea level is 46.1%, but rises to 63.3% in areas 
3,500 meters above sea level. They find a clear relationship between household welfare and 
geographic variables, highlighting that some of the poorest people live in the most geographically 
adverse regions. Deeper analysis reveals that these spatial differences are driven not by disparities 
in geographical characteristics, but rather by discrepancies in public goods provision across regions. 
Despite a general increase in public spending between 1999 and 2003, the government continued to 
favor urban areas over rural areas, thus exacerbating regional inequality. The greatest difference 
was in access to sanitation: while 84% of households had access to sanitation in urban areas, only 
12% did so in rural areas. 
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 Soto and Torche (2004) obtain similar results for Chile, a country often lauded as a Latin 
American ‘tiger economy’, where regional inequality has widened in recent years.  The authors 
argue that growth in Chile has been largely driven by improvements in particular sectors (such as 
fishing, transportation and telecommunications), which are centered in particular regions.  To the 
extent that growth in these sectors has benefitted from publicly-provided infrastructure, fiscal policy 
has played an important role in supporting certain regions’ rapid development, resulting in an 
unequal growth rate between regions and increased spatial inequality. 
 Such findings are not limited to Latin America.  In a study of Central Asia, Anderson and 
Pomfret (2004) found rural households significantly worse off than urban households in most 
countries. They attribute this to a strong public sector bias in favor of urban areas, especially where 
investment and public services are concerned.  The two exceptions to this rule were Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan. In the case of Kazakhstan, low regional inequality is credited to low levels of variation 
in public goods provision. In a similar vein, low regional inequality in Uzbekistan is credited to 
redistributive policy that uses tax collection on social service provision to help mitigate regional 
disparities. 
In Africa, Sahn and Stifel (2003) found that the population living below the poverty line is 
about 50% greater in rural areas than in urban areas. They attribute most of these differences to a 
skewed distribution of schools and health care facilities that favor urban centers. These results are 
tempered by Christiansen et al (2005), who argue that remoteness plays a vital role in aggravating 
poverty. Their study shows that poor transport infrastructure isolates regions from the capital and 
coast, leading to a lack of opportunities and an increase in inequality. 
Regional inequalities have increased markedly in India and China in recent decades, as is 
chronicled by a small cottage industry of studies.  In both cases, researchers have attributed 
inequality to a combination of factors, including reforms in fiscal and trade policies, and differences 
in regions’ natural endowments. For India, Shankar and Shah (2003), Bajpai and Sachs (1996), and 
Nagaraj et al. (2000) all find that there has been a significant increase in regional inequality 
between 1980 and 1996. The highest increase in regional inequality occurred after 1992, when 
liberalization reforms were begun. 
The period since reform began in China in 1979 has also seen regional inequality increase 
rapidly in that country.  Kanbur and Zhang (1999) document that differences in annual growth rates 
between costal and inland regions have been as high as 3% over the last 20 years. Zhang and Fan 
(2006) find that while agricultural GDP per worker grew by 167% between 1978 and 1995 in 
coastal regions, it grew by only 108% in central regions, and a mere 56% in western regions.  These 
differences are due to a combination of factors, including differential access to world markets given 
by geography (including proximity to Hong Kong and Taiwan), the availability of skilled labor, and 
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local and regional investments in infrastructure that facilitate industrial development and foreign 
investment. 
The empirical evidence thus strongly supports the notion that fiscal policy can help create or 
exacerbate spatial inequalities, in line with what economic theory predicts.  Once inequalities have 
been created, can fiscal policy help to overcome them?  If fiscal (or any other) policy contributes to 
generating inequality in the first place, then eliminating or reversing such policies should help 
reduce inequality.  And even in cases where policy did not contribute to inequality, leveling out 
regional disparities is part of what fiscal policy is for. Thus theory, supported by the sorts of 
evidence cited above, would unambiguously predict the answer to be ‘yes’. 
But strangely, empirical evidence for the ability of fiscal policy to counteract existing 
inequalities is not so clear cut.  On the one hand, a number of single-country studies, like Mas, 
Maudos, Pérez and Uriel’s (1994, 1995) work on Spanish regions, find that public investment in 
infrastructure spurs convergence.  But for each of these, there seems to be a similar study that finds 
the opposite; hence Gorostiaga (1999) finds that public investment is not statistically significant for 
explaining convergence across the regions of Spain.  Much the same is true across large cross-
country studies.  For a sample of 90 countries, Barro (1991) finds a weak negative relationship 
between public investment (as a proportion of private investment) and economic growth.  But 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find that public investment – especially in transport and 
communications – has a positive and significant effect on growth for a sample of 100 countries. 
Results are also ambiguous for smaller, less heterogeneous samples.  On the positive side, 
Cashin (1995) estimates an endogenous growth model and finds a positive effect of public 
investment on growth for the countries of the OECD.  Thomas (1996) finds much the same for 
European regions, using an aggregate indicator of infrastructure investment.  De la Fuente (1997a) 
finds positive effects of public investment on growth for the countries of the OECD, albeit with 
decreasing returns to scale.  Romero de Ávila and Strauch (2003) find that public investment in the 
EU-15 countries has a positive effect on economic growth in the long run. And in a sample of 42 
low and middle-income countries, Hulten (1996) finds that public investment has helped to spur 
TFP growth.  But on the negative side, Hulten (1996) also finds that the inefficient use of these 
public resources has reduced their effect on growth.  And Kelly’s (1997) study of 56 low and 
middle-income countries finds that high levels of public investment affect economic growth 
negatively. 
How do we make sense of this evidence?  Why, when the theoretical arguments are 
unambiguous, is the evidence so difficult to interpret?  Beyond keeping a rough scorecard of the 
tally of positive and negative results (positives are out in front, but not by much), consider the 
substance of the results – especially the last two findings cited above.  When used inefficiently, 
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public resources have a small effect on growth (Hulten 1996).  One can easily imagine greater 
inefficiency reducing the effectiveness of public investment to zero. Taking this logic one step 
further (Kelly 1997), public investment that is both very high and very inefficient can easily 
subtract from national income.  Indeed, there is much evidence that precisely this is what happened 
in the Soviet Bloc economies in the late 1970s and 1980s, when many public sector enterprises 
became value subtractors (e.g. Teichova 1997). 
Hence the question is not fundamentally one of economic theory, but rather of the political 
economy of implementation and policy effectiveness.  Can fiscal policy spur economic growth in 
poorer regions, and thus promote convergence?  Studies such as Berndt and Hansson (1991), 
Conrad and Seitz (1992, 1994), Lynde and Richmond (1992, 1993a, 1993b), Morrison and 
Schwartz (1992, 1996), Avilés et al. (2001), Boscá et al. (2002) and Moreno et al. (2002) all 
chronicle how public investment can spur economic activity via reductions in business costs.  
These, in addition to the positive results cited above on the particular question of convergence, 
show us that the answer to this question in principle is ‘yes’.  Why, then, are econometric results so 
often insignificant or even negative?  Because fiscal tools are misused or inefficiently applied.  
Specific measures intended to reduce inequality are distorted in implementation – captured by 
interest groups or mis-applied by inept bureaucracies.  They do not have the effects intended not 
because the fiscal theory is wrong, but because policy implementation is poor. 
This leads us to the further observation that studies operating at a high level of aggregation 
are unlikely to shed much light on the question of fiscal policy effectiveness.  When issues such as 
the quality of implementation become key, approaches that abstract away from the variety of fiscal 
tools available, let alone issues of implementation, and condense “fiscal policy” into a single – or 
two or three – indicators (e.g. Barro 1991) are unlikely to provide us with the level of detail 
required if we are to reach informed conclusions about the ability of fiscal policy to equalize 
growth, income and welfare across space.  Ultimately, the best way to research such questions is 
through detailed case studies, where dynamic processes of policy reform can be identified, their 
robustness characterized, and their effects on inequality traced in detail.  For this reason, the 
remainder of this paper turns shortly to case studies of policy reform in Mexico, Brazil and Bolivia.  
But before doing so, we turn to one last handful of studies that attempt to unpack the concept of 
fiscal policy into discrete, well-defined components, and measure their effects in a nuanced, 
detailed manner. 
Kim (2008) cites empirical findings across many countries – most of them developed – 
indicating that “industry localization economies (within-industry spillovers) are generally more 
important than urbanization economies (across-industry spillovers). Thus, at least in principle, 
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policy makers may be able to influence spatial inequality by targeting industry-specific subsidies or 
infrastructural investments.” (p.36) 
Kim (2008) cites further evidence that transportation and communications infrastructural 
investments are associated with declines in spatial inequality. 
“Several studies suggest that inter-regional infrastructure investments may contribute to the 
reduction of urban concentration (Henderson et. al 2001). Gallup et. al (1999) point to the 
importance of the historical investments in national navigable waterways, Rosen and Resnick 
(1978) to rail investments, and Henderson (2002) to the national road and highway investments. 
Baum-Snow (2007) shows that the introduction of interstate highways in the United States 
reduced central city population growth by at least 8% between 1950 and 1990.” (p.39) 
Martin and Rogers (1995) and Martin (1999) show that infrastructure investments can have 
different effects on inequality depending on the degree of connectivity they display.  Locally-
specific investments that reduce the cost of transport within poor regions can help to reduce 
industrial concentration in a country, and favor the disadvantaged region(s).  But this may not 
necessarily lead to convergence in regional incomes, as the returns on capital and labor in different 
regions follow more complicated dynamics.  By contrast, Faini (1983) and Combes and Lafourcade 
(2000) show that public investments that reduce the cost of transport between poor regions and 
international markets do lead to convergence in regional incomes.  Thus if combating inequality is 
the objective, it is not enough to invest in “transportation”.  The nature of the transport links 
improved, and their articulation across space, are important considerations for determining their 
effects on regional incomes. 
In a similar vein, Zhang and Fan (2006) show that different types of public expenditures 
have different effects. Moreover, the sector in which the public good is provided has an important 
effect on its level of impact. For China, the most significant form of public spending for reducing 
regional inequality is education. This is true both in the agricultural and the non-agricultural sector. 
The second most significant good is roads for the agricultural sector, and telephones for the non-
agricultural sector. Given a scarcity of resources, they counsel, developing country governments 
should channel their funds towards the provision of goods that have the maximum impact. 
Building on this empirical evidence, plus the theoretical ideas developed in the previous 
section, figure 2 provides a typology of fiscal policies relevant for issues of spatial inequality. 
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Figure 2: A Typology of Fiscal Policies Relevant for Spatial Inequality 
Type Examples 
Relevance to Spatial 
Inequality 
Govt. Spending     
Cash transfer Lopez and Perry (2008) : low levels of government spending in Latin 
America explain the high level of inequality found in the region. They 
contrast this to Europe which uses a high tax rate and government 
transfers to equalize disposable income. 
  
       - Conditional     
            Targeted World Bank (2004): Mexico has been able to reduce inequality through 
Oportunidades which is a cash transfer in exchange for households 
sending their children to school, getting regular health checks and having 
a nutritious diet. 
High - should be progressive 
            Universal This category seems to be seldom used in practice.   
       - Unconditional      
            Targeted This category seems to be seldom used in practice.   
            Universal World Bank (2008): Argentina's universal public services system seems 
to have reduced inequality by increasing the lower end and capping the 
upper end of the distribution. 
Modest - should be progressive 
      
Government running 
expenses   
Low - tends to be regressive 
       - Non-salary 
expenses    
Low 
       - Salary expenses  
  
Moderate - could be 
progressive, depending on 
public employee profile 
      
Investment     
      
  Human Capital Costa-i-Font and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2005): found social spending to 
have a positive, but lagged impact on spatial inequality  
High - impacts low income 
groups 
  World Bank (2004): High levels of provision of social infrastructure, 
through FIAS to poor states lead to a reduction of regional inequality.  
High – progressive 
  
Anderson and Pomfert (2004): High prioritization to social spending has 
helped keep spatial inequality low in Uzbekistan. 
High - Spatial inequality is the 
lowest in Uzbekistan when 
compared to other Central 
Asian States. 
  World Bank (2008): Argentina's universal public services system seems 
to have reduced inequality by increasing the lower end and capping the 
upper end of the distribution. 
Modest - should be progressive 
       - Health  Escobal and Torero (2003): public spending differences explain most of 
the regional inequality found in Peru 
High - potentially progressive 
  Shan and Stifel (2003) found that inequality in Africa can be attributed to 
skewed distribution of health care facilities in favor of urban centers.  
High 
            concentrated     
            intermediate     
            Dispersed     
      
       - Education  Escobal and Torero (2003): public spending differences explain most of 
the regional inequality found in Peru 
High - potentially progressive 
  Zhang and Fan (2006) : find that educational spending has the highest 
impact in reducing spatial inequality in China 
  
            Specialized and 
narrow 
Zhang and Fan (2006) : Find that spending on agricultural R&D has a 
significant impact on reducing regional inequality within the agricultural 
sector. 
Medium - progressive 
            Broad and basic Shan and Stifel (2003) found that inequality in Africa can be attributed to 
skewed distribution of schools in favor of urban centers.  
High - progressive 
      
       - Water and 
sanitation 
Escobal and Torero (2003): public spending differences explain most of 
the regional inequality found in Peru 
High - potentially progressive 
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  Physical Capital Costa-i-Font and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2005): Found that spending on 
infrastructure has an immediate and positive impact on reducing spatial 
inequality.  
Low - impact mainly on 
medium and high income 
groups 
       - Connectivity     
            Roads Christiansen et al (2005), argue that poor transport infrastructure isolates 
regions from the capital and coast, leading to a lack of opportunities and 
an increase in inequality. 
High - progressive 
            ICT Zhang and Fan (2006) : find that spending on telephone networks has a 
significant impact on reducing regional inequality within the non-
agricultural sector in China 
Medium - progressive 
      
Type Examples 
Relevance to Spatial 
Inequality 
Subsidies     
       - Luxury This category seems to be seldom used in practice. Regressive 
       - General Gasoline subsidies in Venezuela, Iran, and many other oil-producing 
countries 
Neutral 
       - Necessity Tortilla subsidies in Mexico; Bread subsidies in Egypt Progressive 
      
Taxes 
Anderson and Pomfert (2004): Efficient tax collection in Uzbekistan has 
helped keep spatial inequality very low in the country. 
High - Spatial inequality is the 
lowest in Uzbekistan when 
compared to other Central 
Asian States. 
       - Commercial tax     
            Tax holiday     
      
       - Sales tax     
      
       - Income tax     
            Progressive Lopez and Perry (2008) : low tax rates in Latin America explain the high 
level of inequality found in the region. They contrast this to Europe 
which uses a high tax rate and government transfers to equalize 
disposable income. 
High - progressive 
            Proportional   High - regressive 
 
Lastly, Kim (2008) counsels against high hopes when implementing any of these policies, 
warning that history offers few successful outcomes of policies to combat spatial inequality. 
“The recent attempts to reduce spatial inequality among the nations in the European Union 
present a cautionary tale. By most accounts, the EU policies implemented to reduce EU regional 
inequality have proved ineffective (Puga 2002). The policy objectives were to promote the 
development of lagging regions, to support areas facing structural difficulties, and to develop 
systems of education, training and employment. Between 2000-2006, the EU devoted €195,000 
million (in 1999 prices), representing over 30% of total EU spending, and the Cohesion Fund 
added another €18,000 million to meet these objectives. Yet, despite the allocation of massive 
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resources, regional inequalities have not narrowed and by some accounts have even widened.” 
(p.39) 
4. Case Study: Mexico 
Mexico is plagued by a very high level of poverty and inequality. According to the World 
Bank’s (2004) findings Mexico had a Gini Index in 2000 was 54.6. Moreover, it has been 
documented that most of this inequality is spatially driven and is not due to household 
characteristics (Wodon 1999, World Bank 2006). Shanker and Shah (2003) while studying regional 
inequality calculated Mexico’s regional weighted Gini index to be 0.3 in 19983. This is more than 
seven times the level of regional inequality found in the United States (0.039 in 1997). The only 
other developing countries with higher regional weighted Gini indices in their study were Vietnam 
(0.41 in 1997), Thailand (0.442 in1997) and South Africa (0.341 in 1994). Therefore, regional 
inequality is a serious problem that needs to be addressed through targeted spending programs.  
In the last two decades Mexico has in fact instituted a number of public spending programs 
with the explicit objective of reducing spatial inequality. These include programs such as 
Oportunidades, Pronasol, Procampo, and FAIS (Fondo de Aportaciones para la Infraestructura 
Social) to name a few of the most important. Oportunidades was founded in 2002, and was based on 
Progresa (which was created in 1997). The purpose of the program is to encourage school 
attendance, health checks and give nutritional support. This was achieved by giving families cash 
transfers in exchanges for doing the above. The IADB (2005) estimated that in 2004 around 5 
million Mexican households were participating in this program. Pronasol was a development 
program initiated in the 1990s. It’s agenda was to provide poor communities funds towards projects 
such as drinking water, paved roads etc on the condition that they contribute part of the funds and/or 
labor needed. However, the program had to be cancelled as it became evident that it was used 
largely for political purposes. Procampo was set up in 1994 and offered farmers direct subsidies in 
an effort to reduce poverty. The money was distributed by the Ministry of Agriculture. However, 
this too was used by the PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party] as a political tool to further enhance 
their vote bank.  Lastly, the government set up FAIS in 1997 in order to help improve the 
infrastructure available to the poor. It covered a wide range of goods such as potable water, health, 
sanitary facilities etc. The program was based on the realization that infrastructural provision can 
have a significant impact on the quality of life for the poor.  
                                                 
3 This index was weighted by population and was calculated based on differences in Gross Regional Domestic Product 
(GRDP). 
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Given that the Mexican government established all these developmental funds it is worth 
investigating what the criterion for distribution was. This will enable us to better understand the 
outcomes of government spending.  
Allocation criterion 
De la Fuente & Vives (1995) argue that governments can have three bases for allocating 
resources. They can be pro-efficiency, which would entail allocating funds to regions with the 
highest expected returns. Such a government would be of the view that increased growth will have a 
trickle down effect thus benefiting the poor eventually. Alternatively the government can have a 
pro-equity strategy, which would entail allocating resources to the poorest regions, maybe even at 
the expense of the rich regions. Lastly the criterion could be an intermediate way. This would 
require that public investment not give any region an added advantage. De la Fuente & Vives 
(1995) agree that this is a difficult criterion to follow as it is not very well defined.  
Rodriguez-Oreggia and Rodriguez-Pose (2004) set out to test which, out of the three above 
mentioned criterions, the Mexican government was following when distributing funds. Table 1 
shows their ranking of the different states based on De la Fuente & Vives’s (1995) three criterions.  
If spending was following a pro-efficiency allocation then Nuevo Leon, Guanajuato, Mexico 
City and Quintana Roo should have received the bulk of the funding as they had the highest 
expected returns. If the goal was to minimize inequality then Chiapas, Oaxaca, Tlaxcala and 
Michoacan should have received most of government spending as they were the four poorest states. 
Lastly, if they were wanting to have neutral results (i.e. the third alternative) then Guanajuato, 
Puebla, Mexico City and Chiapas should have received the largest share of resources. 
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Table 1: Expected returns, income per capita and allocated stock of economic public 
infrastructure 
 
Source: Rodriguez-Oreggia and Rodriguez-Pose (2004) 
Table 2 documents the actual patterns of spending in Mexico from 1970 to 1999. From 
1971-1985 the four states to receive the most funds were Tabasco (334), Campeche (326), Baja 
California Sur (253) and Quintana Roo (221). In 1985-1999 the four largest recipient were 
Campeche (751), Distrito Federal (253), Tabasco (219) and  Baja California Sur (179). From the 
table above it can be seen that the Mexican government clearly was not aiming to maximize 
efficiency or reduce inequality and neither was it trying to maintain a neutral approach. 
Interestingly, the four states who received the lion’s share of government resources from 1970 to 
1999 were some the richest states in the country, while the fifth one was a middle income state. On 
the GDP ranking Distrito Federal was the richest state ranking 32, followed by Quintana Roo at 31, 
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Campeche at 30 and Baja California Sur at 26. Tabasco, the middle income state, had a ranking of 
114. Furthermore, the only state to qualify on the grounds of efficiency was Quintana Roo which 
ranked 4. The others had a rather low ranking on the expected returns ranking with Distrito Federal 
ranking 28, Campeche was 11, Baja California Sur was 7 and Tabasco ranked 155. 
Table 2: Total public investment per capita (average = 100) 
 
Source: Rodriguez-Oreggia and Rodriguez-Pose (2004) 
 
Thus it is clear, the authors claim, that the government was not following any of the three 
criteria set out by De la Fuente & Vives, (1995). If anything, it could be argued that the 
government’s strategy seemed to be pro-rich spending. More likely, the real underlying criterion of 
allocation is political, which is why richer regions that are more abundant in political contributors 
receive higher allocations. The next subsection lays out the results of the government spending 
programs supporting the claim that there was a clear bias towards rich states.  
                                                 
4 Ranking was 1 for the poorest state and 32 for the richest. 
5 Ranking was 1 for the highest expected return and 32 for the lowest. 
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Results of Mexico’s developmental spending 
Before getting into the details of the results it is worth highlighting the extent to which poor 
states rely on federal transfers. Figure 2 provides a breakdown of states’ own resources and various 
federal transfers. States are ordered from poorest to richest based on the Consejo Nacional de la 
Población (CONAPO), index of marginality for 2002. The graph clearly illustrates the meagerness 
of poor states’ own resources and their extreme reliance on federal transfers.  Focusing on the black 
segments at the bottom of each bar, we see that the poorest states have up to 90% less own revenue 
than some of the richer states.  But this does not mean that they receive greater distributions of 
central government resources.  None of the next four lighter-shaded segments seems to vary 
systematically with either states’ poverty ranking, or with their own resources.  As a result, there is 
no relationship between total public resources and states’ poverty rankings.  This point is clearest at 
the aggregate level.  If overall allocations were pro-equity, we would expect the bars in the chart to 
line up along a downward-sloping line, perhaps looking something like this: 
 
If total allocations were pro-efficiency, we might expect the bars to line up along an upward-sloping 
line, with the most productive (and hence richest) states receiving more resources, perhaps looking 
something like this: 
 
But in fact we see neither pattern.  The “pattern” that we do see appears somewhat random, 
unrelated to poverty, states’ underlying own resources, or efficiency and growth. 
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Figure 2: Geographic distribution of public resources as a share of GDP 2002 
 
 
Further evidence confirms the view that Mexico’s past spending experience has not favored 
the poor much. The wide array of programs that the Mexican government instituted in 2000 and 
2002 are shown in figure 3. The graph shows various types of social spending and subsidies 
provided by central government. These programs have been placed on an index ranging from -1 to 
1, where -1 indicates that all the funds went to the poorest household (thus being highly equalizing), 
0 implies that everyone received the same amount, and +1 shows that funds were spent on the 
richest households (i.e. worsening inequality). It is clear from figure 3 that most programs tended to 
benefit richer households as opposed to the poor.  
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Figure 3: Government spending programs (2000 and 2002) 
 
A breakdown of public spending on three indicators of well-being – education, health and 
agricultural eclectic subsidies – further validate these findings. Figure 4 illustrates federal transfers 
to the three respective areas of public spending. States are arranged from the poorest to the richest. 
It can be seen that while health spending and agricultural electric subsidies had a clear rich state 
bias, spending on education too was slanted in favor of the better off states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Federal Transfers: 
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 Figure 4a: Principle Federal Expenditure on Basic Education 2004  
 
 
 
Figure 4b: Geographic distribution of agricultural electric subsidies 2002 
 
 
 
Figure 4c: Distribution of Health Sector Expenditure per Capita 2004  
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However, all is not lost for the poorer regions of Mexico. The government has been able to 
institute two targeted anti-poverty programs; Oportunidades and FAIS. Figure 5 shows how the 
Mexican government has been successful in targeting the marginalized states in 2002 as far as these 
two programs are concerned. While these funds are not enough to reduce the gap between the rich 
and poor states of Mexico they, nonetheless, do help to some extent. 
Figure 5: Geographic distribution of targeted anti-poverty spending 2002 
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Why does poverty targeting so often fail? 
As the above analysis has shown, the Mexican government has been generally unsuccessful 
in targeting poor states. Instead it seems that they have targeted rich states, often to the detriment of 
the poor. Moreover, it is clear from the evidence presented above that expenditures do not target 
areas with the highest return, and so do not maximize growth. Neither do expenditures seem to 
follow some sort of intermediary criterion. The question then is: what is driving the allocation of 
federal funds in Mexico?  One possible explanation we extend is political targeting – the use of 
political fund to buy votes for the ruling party. 
The presence of patronage politics, coupled with low levels of political institutionalization is 
found in most developing countries (Chabal and Daloz 1999), Mexico being no exception (World 
Bank 2003). Low levels of institutionalization reduce the checks and balances on incumbent 
politicians, thus enabling them to engage in rent-seeking and political targeting – the only constraint 
being their ambition for re-election. In Mexico’s case re-election was not a seen as a major 
constraint as the country was largely ruled by one party – PRI.  
This was particularly stark in the case of Pronosol where allocation was given in return for 
votes (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2004). However, the World Bank’s report on poverty in Mexico 
(2004) argues that the government is trying to reduce this by moving away from programs like 
Pronosol, and providing more targeted schemes like Oportunidades. The results of these shifts are 
yet to be seen. 
It could be argued that one of the reasons for the success of Oportunidades has to do with 
the nature of the program itself. It aims to provide households with cash transfers in exchange for 
sending their children to school and going to health clinics. Also, it makes direct cash transfers so as 
to help improve the nutritional level of households. A program like this has two advantages. Firstly, 
it clearly allows the target group  to be identified; and secondly, benefits can be easily stigmatized 
for richer populations, thus increasing the rate of successful targeting and hence efficiency of 
expenditure.     
5. Case Study: Brazil 
Brazil suffers from two inter-related problems – a very high incidence of poverty, and a very 
high level of inequality. Herrán (2005), when analyzing the economy of Brazil, highlights that the 
high level of poverty is driven by extreme inequality as opposed to the capacity of the country to 
generate income. Pochman et al. (2003) find that the richest 1% enjoy an income equal to that of the 
poorest 50%. Brazil’s Gini index in 2001 was 59.0 (World Bank 2004). Moreover, the poor are 
concentrated in the North, thus causing spatial inequality. The figure below illustrates the 
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geographical distribution of the poor in Brazil. As can be observed from the map below, the north 
has a much higher number of poor households as compared to the South (RR and AP are of course 
an exception). 
 
 
Herrán (2005) documents that in 2000, 24% of inequality was explained by regional 
differences, while 76% was due to household-specific characteristics. Table 3 below is an extract of 
the table he uses, giving a break-up of both types of inequality in Brazil between 1991 and 2000. 
Within the different types of ‘spaces’, the main contributor to total inequality in 2000 was the 
municipality (14%), then the region (8%), and lastly the state (2%). 
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Table 3: Components of Geographic inequality in Brazil (2002) 
 
cited in Herrán (2005) 
Even though the estimated value of inter-personal inequality is three times that of spatial 
inequality, we still believe it is worth studying (and formulating policies for) spatial inequality in 
Brazil for three reasons. Firstly, although decomposing inequality by type in this way is a useful 
exercise in itself, it nevertheless begs the question of why so many poor families are located in the 
Brazilian north (and especially northeast), or —in a related point—why income extremes amongst 
families are so high.  Secondly, even on Barros et al.’s numbers – which are comparatively 
conservative within the literature on Brazil – spatial inequality still accounts for 24% of total 
inequality. And thirdly, spatial inequality is largely driven by differences in either public goods 
provision or economic opportunities, or both, and as such should be particularly susceptible to 
public policy interventions. As mentioned earlier, an increase in public goods provision would 
attract private investment to the region, which should help to improve inter-personal inequality as 
well. The matrix in section 3 shows more generally the clear overlap in policies targeting spatial 
and interpersonal inequality. Therefore, focusing on spatial inequality does not ignore interpersonal 
inequality.  
The World Bank (2004) report on inequality and economic development in Brazil highlights 
some of the stark differences found between regions. For instance, life expectancy at birth ranges 
from 63.2 years in Alagoas to 71.6 years in Rio Grande do Sul (p.3). Also, while the incidence of 
poverty is only 3.1% in Sao Paulo’s metropolitan region it is more that 50% in the rural northeast 
(p.3). Furthermore, as the figure below shows there are clear differences in income based on spatial 
differences. 
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Figure 6: Mean Household per Capita Income by Region and Area (Rural-Urban) – 1999 
 
 
The figure above shows that the incidence of poverty is much higher in the Northeast than in 
Southeast regions. Also the incidence of poverty is much more severe in rural areas as opposed to 
urban areas. The impact of regional differences in driving inequality is further highlighted by 
Herrán’s (2005) regression results, which control for education, occupation of household, race, 
labor market status of household, urban/rural divide, gender of household head, individual 
characteristics and age group. This is shown in figure 7.  
Figure 7: Poverty predictors  
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Source: Herrán (2005) 
The Brazilian government, recognizing the high level of inequality in the country, has over 
the years instituted programs to try and reduce poverty and close the gap between the rich and the 
poor. The main one, introduced in October 2003 is Bolsa Familia (the Family Bonus Program), a 
federal cash transfer scheme. This program integrated four previous schemes; Bolsa Escola (school 
bursary from the Ministry of Education), Bolsa Alimentacao (food allowance from the Ministry of 
Health), Cartao Alimentacao (food card) and Auxilio Gas (gas allowance from the Ministry of 
Mines and Energy). All of these were conditional cash transfers given on the bases of household 
income. The objective of Bolsa Familia was to reduce inequality and avoid future poverty related 
problems. Allocation was based on household income (had to be a maximum of around US$ 60 a 
month).  
Results of Developmental Spending 
The results of the impact of public spending on spatial inequality seem to have produced 
mixed results. Herrán’s (2005) study shows (see table 4) that the gap between rural and urban 
households has decreased. Poverty in urban areas contributed an increase of 20% points towards 
total poverty, while rural areas’ contribution to total poverty actually fell by 25% points. Moreover, 
there has been an increase in urban population by 13%, while the share of the population living in 
rural areas has fallen by 21%. Therefore the overall fall in the incidence of poverty was 5% in rural 
households while it was only 1.2% in urban ones. Furthermore, the Northeast too has seen a 
substantial reduction in poverty (though the Southeast has reduced poverty more). However, the 
North has seen an increase in the incidence of poverty. So while inequality has gone down over 
some spaces, it has increased over others. IPEA (2006b) supports these findings with evidence that 
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the overall condition of the poor improved between 2001 and 2004 as the figures dealing with 
inequality and extreme poverty fell. 
Table 4: Group with the Highest Changes in Poverty Share (1981-2002) 
Selected Groups Changes in 
poverty share6 
Changes in population
share7 
Changes in poverty  
incidence 
Urban households + 20% points + 13% -1.2% 
Households in the North + 6% points + 3% + 7% 
Rural households - 25% points - 21% - 5% 
Households in the Southeast - 5% points - 1% - 11% 
Households in the Northeast - 3% points - 1% - 10% 
Source: Herrán (2005) 
 
Kakwani et al. (2006) argue that Brazil has in recent years had pro-poor growth, i.e. growth 
that proportionally benefits the poor more than the rich. Their findings are presented in the graph 
below.  Interestingly, it can be seen that after 2003 there is a sharp increase in pro-poor growth after 
(which is when Bolsa Familia was initiated). They credit pro-poor government spending as playing 
a crucial role in protecting the poor from market crises.   
                                                 
6 The change in a group’s contribution towards the total incidence of poverty in Brazil. 
7 The percentage of the population residing in a particular group. 
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Figure 8: Pro-poor Growth Rates 
 
Source: Kakwani et al. (2006) 
Reasons for success 
It can be argued that one of the main reasons Brazil has been able to successfully target its 
anti-poor programs is that – like Oportunidades in Mexico – it is very easy to identify the target 
group, and it is possible to stigmatize program benefits for richer populations. Cash transfers are 
given in exchange for school attendance, for health checks, and other welfare-related issues. They 
thus not only provide the household with an income, but also ensure that they have the conditions 
needed to secure economic resources for themselves in the future. Much more such reform is 
needed in Brazil, whose population continues to suffer very high levels of inequality and poverty. 
6. Case Study: Argentina 
Even in comparison to other Latin American countries, Argentina has seen large changes in 
its fiscal policy stance, and relations between the state, the economy, and society more broadly.  In 
the space of one generation, the country moved from a social democratic model of active social 
integration, to one that approximated the so-called “Washington consensus”, featuring resource 
allocation based on market signals.  Before discussing Argentina’s principal fiscal policies today 
with relevance to inequality, it is important to understand this background, as it has implications not 
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only for the level of spatial inequality that the country now faces, but also the legacy upon which 
the present policy mix is at least partly based. 
 
Fiscal Policy: Historical Background 
Until about 1976, Argentine policy sought to guide the economy to full employment through 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), active labor market policy predicated on strong unions, 
and high levels of social investment via universal public services operated by the state.  The 
combination of rapid oil price rises of the 1970s with the 1976-1983 military dictatorship known as 
the “Process of National Reorganization” put an end to this policy stance, and began a long, uneven 
process of state retrenchment from economic intervention that finally culminated with the 
privatizations of the mid 1990s.  Alongside such predictable measures as the closing of Congress, 
the Supreme Court, and the suspension of political parties, the 1976 military junta announced a 
series of changes in economic policy that amounted to a new policy framework.  Some of the most 
important of these are: 
• Elimination of protective tariffs and regulations 
• Elimination of state subsidies to firms and industries 
• Liberalization of financial markets 
• Suspension of workers’ rights and prohibition of strikes 
• Intervention of unions, including the General Confederation of Labor 
• Intervention of the General Confederation of Employers 
(Ministerio de Educación 2001) 
The dictatorship ended in failure, with high inflation, increasing unemployment, widespread 
bankruptcies in the private sector, and the disastrous military adventure in the Falklands that led to 
comprehensive surrender to a British expeditionary force.  The recovery of democracy in 1983 was 
accompanied by crises in public finances, and then the local chapter of the more widespread Latin 
American debt crisis of the 1980s.  In this difficult climate, the democratic government’s increases 
in the share of public expenditures going to social services could not forestall deterioration in the 
quality of public services, due to falling tax revenues and more general economic stagnation and 
decline (World Bank 2008). 
The most important fiscal initiative during this period was the implementation of a National 
Food Program, with wide coverage and a highly centralized management.  This program appeared 
as a response to an increasingly serious and unusual problem for Argentina – high unemployment, 
low wages, and growing informality were producing sharp increases in absolute poverty, with 
serious effects on nutrition, education and health (World Bank 2008).  The previous social model, 
based on a large formal job market and extensive welfare benefits, was sufficiently eroded that it 
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plainly could not cope. Poor labor market conditions, along with the misuse of pension funds, 
helped set the stage for the deterioration of the pension system, which went into a full crisis in the 
mid-1980s. 
Argentina’s second post-“Process” elected government, led by Carlos Menem, comprised a 
surprising blend of political populism and market-friendly economic reform.  A colorful and 
charismatic figure who allowed his personal life to fill the nation’s headlines, Menem’s government 
pursued a vigorous course of privatization, trade liberalization, decentralization, market 
deregulation, and modernization of production (World Bank 2008).  Together, these reforms led to 
an increase in labor supply and a decrease in labor demand (notably by newly privatized 
enterprises), as well as a long-term structural change in the kinds of human capital demanded.  
Partly in response to this, the government deregulated the labor market via the introduction of short-
term contracts, reductions in severance payments to fired workers, and lower social contributions 
(Golbert, 1998). 
With the new economic model and role of the state, the nature of fiscal policy changed as 
well, from universal services to much more limited, targeted programs aimed at specific groups.  
This produced an increase in the number of programs, and hence a need to coordinate them, and 
define goals and criteria for resource distribution.  To this end the Social Development Secretary 
was created. According to a World Bank report, citing Repetto (2003), “four different paths were 
explored at the national level: (1) comprehensive social plans which worked as “umbrella 
mechanisms” (1993 and 1995); (2) consolidation of focalized social programs as an alternative to 
the social plans (1996 and 2000); (3) creation of organisms with programmatic responsibilities such 
as the Social Development Secretary (1995) and the Social Security Ministry (2001); and (4) 
creation of bodies with some degree of responsibility regarding national level poverty policies.” 
(World Bank 2008)   
Perhaps the most emblematic and well-studied policy of this phase was TRABAJAR, a 
program aimed at reducing poverty by simultaneously generating employment opportunities for the 
poor and improving social infrastructure in poor communities.8 Introduced as a pilot program in 
1996 in response to economic crisis and unemployment rates of over 17 percent, TRABAJAR 
expanded through three phases. The program offers relatively low wages in order to attract ("self-
select") poor, unemployed workers as participants. The infrastructure projects that participants are 
hired to work on are proposed by local governments and NGOs, which must cover the nonwage 
costs of the project. Projects are approved at the regional level according to central government 
guidelines. Extensive efforts have been made over time to improve targeting of the poorest families 
                                                 
8 The discussion of TRABAJAR borrows liberally from Baker (2000). 
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and geographic areas, as well as to strengthen the capability of provincial offices for helping poor 
areas mount projects and to raise standards of infrastructure quality. 
Policies such as this, aided hugely by the proceeds of rapid economic growth, had the 
aggregate effect of raising social spending in Argentina above its 1980s levels.  Figure 9 shows that 
in constant peso terms, rises in social spending in the mid 1980s were reversed in the late 1980s, 
and social spending did not achieve a sustained increase until the 1990s, when it eventually 
doubled.  Much of this latter increase was in turn reversed in 2001-02.  
Figure 9: Evolution of Consolidated Public Spending in Argentina by Purpose, 1983-2004 
(constant pesos 2001) 
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Fiscal Policy Reforms Contributed to Rising Inequality 
The new Argentine model of social service provision was based on partial privatization, 
where the better-off tended to opt into the private sector.  This set up very different incentives from 
the previous regime, incentives to which providers and consumers quickly responded.  Thus a fast-
growing private sector in health, education, etc soon became markedly higher-quality than public 
services, leading to sharply higher inequality in the standard of services received by different 
segments of the population (World Bank 2008).  This inequality spanned both the interpersonal and 
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spatial dimensions, and showed itself markedly in differences between the standard of services in 
the three major cities and the three richest provinces, versus the rest of the country.  
The postscript to the Menem-dominated 1990s was a comprehensive economic collapse in 
2001 under the successor government, and the largest sovereign default in history.  The immediate 
cause of the crisis was the collapse of the Convertibility Plan, which had so successfully reduced 
both inflation and inflationary expectations during this period.  Some of the deeper causes included 
an overvalued exchange rate that progressively hobbled exports, excessive spending by provincial 
governments, and a politically weak government unable to act decisively.  This crisis proved the 
worst ever in Argentina’s colorful history of economic crises, a sort of social and political cyclone 
that swept away much of the political establishment, and plunged large swathes of the middle class 
into poverty.  Unemployment – already high – rocketed in the wake of the collapse, and the official 
poverty rate in Argentina – for generations a middle class country – rose to 58% of the population 
(Blanco 2005). 
Inequality in social services, combined with the changes in the labor market and welfare 
policies noted above, contributed significantly to increasing income inequality in Argentina during 
this period.  In the 1980s Argentina’s Gini coefficient hovered around 0.40; immediately after the 
2001 collapse it reached 0.55 (Blanco 2005).  For the sake of comparison, Sweden and Norway 
boast Gini coefficients of less than 0.30, whereas the most unequal countries in Latin America have 
Ginis of 0.60 (see Figure 1 above).  Note that Argentina’s newly high inequality statistics 
incorporate a number of workfare and income transfer programs explicitly designed to cope with 
the effects of the crisis.  Without these, far more people would have sunk into deep poverty, and 
Argentine inequality would have rivaled Latin America’s worst. 
Thus the increasing trend in total inequality in Argentina from the 1970s onwards.  Many 
studies have confirmed this fact, and many have sought to establish its causes (Santos 2005).  But 
what about our main concern here – spatial inequality? 
Increasing spatial income inequality in Argentina was driven by inequality in social services 
– especially in education.  Although this topic deserves further research, Santos (2005) provides 
convincing empirical results that support this interpretation.  After noting the long-term increase in 
inequality in Argentina after 1974, she finds that 
“…education plays a very important role in the determination of spatial income inequality. Urban 
agglomerations with a high percentage of people who have completed primary education appear to have 
lower inequality, while urban areas with a high percentage of people who have completed secondary 
education show higher inequality. Urban areas with higher unemployment rates, higher returns to 
education and a lower percentage of people employed in the secondary sector tend to have higher levels 
of inequality. Areas with a higher percentage of people with unsatisfied basic needs and a higher 
percentage of households with indigenous members also show higher levels of inequality, although the 
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effect of ethnicity is small. We also find association between spatial inequality and dependency and the 
level of development.” (p.4) 
 
Fiscal Policy Responses to Inequality9  
The single most important policy innovation in response to Argentina’s crisis was probably 
the Plan Jefas y Jefes de Hogar. This income transfer program provided direct income support for 
families with dependents who had lost their main source of income. The program was large-scale, 
reaching more than 1,000,000 beneficiaries half a year after its implementation, but also highly 
targeted.  It is interesting to note that this targeting empowered new social actors who were direct 
beneficiaries of these social programs (Lodola 2005). The best known example is the piqueteros 
movement with Planes Jefas y Jefes de Hogar and Trabajar.  Piquetero leaders achieved privileged 
positions in the administration of both programs, providing them with a potential source of 
patronage, and hence a base of political power.  Some were able to exploit these conditions to their 
benefit with non-trivial success (Rodgers 2005). Even though work programs were already relevant 
during the 90s (different versions of Trabajar were the largest) an impressive rise in the budget 
occurred in 2002. This rise is explained by the Plan Jefas y Jefes de Hogar.  Figure 10 shows how 
spending on work and income transfer programs changed over time in Argentina.  
                                                 
9 This section relies liberally on the World Bank (2008) study “Public Spending in Social Services.” 
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Figure 10: Evolution of Consolidated Work Spending as a Share of GDP (1983-2004) 
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
1,20
1,40
1,60
1,80
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
*
19
94
*
19
95
*
19
96
*
19
97
*
19
98
*
19
99
**
20
00
**
20
01
**
20
02
**
20
03
**
20
04
**
Work Programs Family Benefits
 
* preliminary; ** estimated  
Source: World Bank (2008); Originally prepared by CIPPEC based on data from 
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The policy response covered the health sector as well.  Public spending in health covers 
several sub-areas: (i) public health provision (hospitals and health centers); (ii) unions’ health 
providers (obras sociales), and (iii) the pensioners’ health system (Instituto nacional de seguridad 
social de jubilados y pensionados, INSSJyP).  The last two constitute spending allocated to people 
with formal employments and pensioners. Further reforms implemented in the 1990s provided 
workers with the possibility to choose their health provider, as well as establishing several 
emergency programs implemented to deal with the crisis such as REMEDIAR.  
In the area of social assistance and promotion, some of the most relevant programs were two 
food programs (PROSONU and POSOCO) managed by the provinces. Other food programs in the 
hands of the federal government were the Child Food and Nutritional Program, ASOMA which was 
oriented to elders, and PROHUERTA which was oriented to families. These programs were 
subsequently merged into a single program called UNIDOS. In order to address the critical situation 
regarding nutrition after the 2001 crisis, the government launched the Emergency Nutrition 
Program (PEA in Spanish), the budget of which reached $330,564,540 in 2003 (equal to 6.4% of the 
social assistance budget). Along with PEA, the Families for Social Inclusion program is the other 
large program created as a consequence of the 2001 crisis, with a budget of $265,461,778 in 2003 
(5.2% of the social assistance budget).  This program aims to give subsidies to needy families that 
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receive no other assistance, as well as to facilitate their access to public education and health 
systems.  
Table 5 summarizes the most important laws governing social policy (including 
employment) in Argentina today at the national, provincial, and municipal levels.  
Table 5: Most Important Laws Regarding Social Policy 
Area Law Number Year
Health Mandatory Health Insurance 18610 1970
Creation of the PAMI 19032 1971
Creation of the Integrated National Health System 1974
Decentralization 21883 1978
Integral Protection System for Handicapped People 22431 1981
Creation of the National Health Insurance System 23661 1989
Creation of the National Office of Social Health Insurance 23660 1989
Decentralization 24061 1991
Work Hazards 24557 1995
National Regulating Entity for Unions' Health Providers Dec. 1615 1996
Modification of the Social Health Insurance System Dec. 1141 1996
Institution of the first mandatory medical program Res. 247 1996
Creation of the Basic System for Integral Care for Handicapped People 24901 1997
Monotributo Tax 25865 2004
Pensions Regime for Hired Workers 18037 1969
Regime  for Independent Workers 18038 1969
Pension System Reform 24241 1994
Rule on Deficit of non Centralized Provincial Pension Systems 25239 1999
Repeal of Special Regimes 25568 2002
Moratorium on Pensions Contributions 25994 2005
Work Unemployment Benefit 24013 1991
Work Programs Financing 25400 2000
Plan Jefas y Jefes Dec. 165 and 565 2002
Housing Creation of FONAVI 21581 1972
FONAVI Reform 24464 1995
FONAVI Reform (50% of the funds can be directed to non housing programs) 25235 2000
FONAVI Reform (the funds can be directed to non housing programs) 25270 2002
Water Water Company (Obras Sanitarias) Privatization 23696 1989
Creation of the Regulatory Body (ENOHSA) 24583 1995
Education Education Decentralization 24049 1992
Federal Education Law 24195 1993
Social Protection Alimentary Emergency Program Dec. 108 2002
Programa Familias Dec. 808 2002
Source: World Bank (2008); originally prepared by CIPPEC based on data from Bertranou and 
Bonari (2006) 
 
Who Benefitted? 
Who benefitted from these fiscal policy initiatives?  Consider the case of TRABAJAR, 
which continued through the 2001 crisis and became one of the government’s backbone policies for 
coping with its social effects.  TRABAJAR was carefully and rigorously evaluated by independent 
researchers.  Baker (2000) reports that without access to the program, about 85 percent of program 
participants would have fallen in the bottom 20 percent of the national income distribution – and 
would therefore be classified as poor in Argentina.  However, matching-method estimates of 
forgone income are sizable, so that average net income gained through program participation was 
about half of the TRABAJAR wage. Even allowing for forgone income, the distribution of gains 
was decidedly pro-poor, with 80 percent of program participants falling in the bottom 20 percent of 
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the income distribution. Net income gains were virtually identical for male and female TRABAJAR 
participants. 
Targeting thus seems to have been quite effective in TRABAJAR, helping to reduce both 
interpersonal and spatial inequality.  Although the program’s effects on spatial inequality has not 
been specifically studied, the fact that a department with 40% of its population classified as poor 
can expect to receive as much as five times the mean departmental allocation implies potentially 
strong equalizing effects.  However, large variations amongst allocations to departments of this 
description reveal a lack of reliability in spatial targeting performance, and thus an area for 
improvement.  Some of the reforms in TRABAJAR II addressed precisely these issues, and seem to 
have successfully enhanced geographic targeting outcomes.  More generally, evaluation results 
provide clear evidence that program participants do come largely from among the poor, and thus 
that self-selection of participants by offering low wages is a strategy that works in Argentina (Baker 
2000). 
An investigation by Gasparini (2004), cited in World Bank (2008), comes to similar, but 
much broader, conclusions.  Gasparini concludes that consolidated public social spending is pro-
poor. 
“Its structure determines that 28.7% reaches the first quintile, 21.9% goes to the second quintile, 
18.5% to the third, 16.8% to the fourth and 14.1% to the fifth quintile. Consolidated social 
spending is also progressive and thus enhances equality among society. According to the 
estimations by Gasparini (2004), the Gini index without public social spending would be 0.54, 
while after public social spending, assuming proportional taxes, it would be 0.45.” (World Bank 
2008) 
Table 8 summarizes his results. 
Table 1: Concentration of Consolidated Social Spending by Quintile (2003) 
Pro-poor Pro-rich 1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintil
Education, Culture, S&T x 25% 22% 20% 18% 15,30%
Health x 19,66% 21,40% 19,30% 21% 18,70%
Water and Sewage 21,58% 19,90% 17,50% 18,60% 22,30%
Housing x 30,90% 18,30% 23,80% 16,80% 10,10%
Social Assistance and Promotion x 45% 25% 17% 9% 4,20%
Work x 49,50% 24,70% 13,20% 8,60% 4%
Urban Services x 13,90% 16,50% 19,60% 22,90% 27%
Consolidated Social Spending x 28,70% 21,90% 18,50% 16,80% 14,10%  
Source: Gasparini (2004) cited in World Bank (2008) 
 
 
 38
7. Decentralization and fiscal federalism 
Decentralization of service delivery has become very prominent in the development 
discourse since the 1980s. Advocates of decentralization argue that it increases service provision 
through two channels: increased accountability, and improved information. Decentralized 
governments can be held more accountable because citizens are able to exercise ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ 
more effectively. Better infrastructure and public goods provision would attract skilled workers and 
capital to a municipality, pulling them away from poorly-provided municipalities. Hence, 
competition between local governments would lead to increased provision (Qian and Weingast 
1997, Tendler 2000). “Voice can work through a variety of mechanisms, including elections that 
vote a party out of office, exposés and critiques in the media, citizen complaints, participation in 
parent schooling committees, street protests, and even, in a few extreme cases, lynching of the 
mayor” (World Bank 2006, p 11). 
Secondly, local government – being closer to the public – will have better information and 
thus will be able to ensure better provision. However, the advantages of local level information 
must be gauged in light of the economies of scale and positive externalities lost in comparison to 
large scale provision by central government.  But before proceeding further, it is important to define 
the term.  Decentralization can be defined as the devolution by central (that is, national) government 
of specific functions, with all of the administrative, political and economic attributes that these 
entail, to democratic sub-national (regional or local) governments that are independent of the centre 
within a legally delimited geographic and functional domain.  It is not so much a fiscal policy or 
specific fiscal reform as it is a broad reorganization of the fiscal relations between different regions 
of a country, and different hierarchical levels of the state.  It is relevant to this paper on account of 
the effects that many claim it has on inequality.  But curiously, there is little agreement about what 
these effects are. 
If we begin with the assumption of high levels of inequality in a country embarking upon 
decentralization, it is easy to suppose that a large change to the existing set of fiscal relations will 
produce an improvement in overall inequality.  Proponents of decentralization argue along these 
lines.  Centralized policy making often favors particular regions or cities at the expense of others, 
and burdens all regions with overly uniform policies and public services too unresponsive to local 
needs and conditions.  Such policies, designed to suit the regions that the center cares about most, 
are part of what holds back development in other regions, impoverishing them and increasing 
spatial inequality.  Along similar lines, Kim (2008) argues that dictatorships, centralized power, and 
a lack of political legitimacy seem to contribute to a centralized urban population in countries hat 
can be so described. 
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Critics of decentralization argue the opposite point.  Central government enjoys the 
advantage of much more easily redistributing resources from more to less advantaged regions, and 
has a strong interest in producing public services and policies to a common standard, that treat 
citizens in all areas of a country equally.  Combating inequality is an important justification for 
having central government.  Decentralization, by contrast, shifts decision-making power over 
services and policies to local authorities, who are expected to finance them to a greater extent from 
locally-raised resources.  By stripping the center of some of its most powerful fiscal tools, 
decentralization hobbles its ability to achieve such goals, leaving the field open to the economic 
forces, such as economies of scale, agglomeration, and other spillovers, that naturally drive 
inequality higher in an economy.  And a reform that ties the production of public services to a local 
tax base will tend to further increase inequality, as richer regions can afford better services and 
infrastructure, which then increase the wealth gap further. 
Which side of this argument does the evidence support?  Empirical evidence surveyed by 
Kim (2008) suggests that “countries with strong state and local governments may have greater 
spatial equality as compared with countries that have a relatively strong federal government” (p. 
39).  Shankar and Shah (2003) conduct an extensive study of both developed and developing 
countries, and find that unitary countries are more unequal when compared to federal countries. 
Amongst federal countries, they find that India (with inequality indices some two to three times US 
levels) has shown an increase in inequality from 1980-96. Their explanation for this is three-fold: (i) 
India was at an early stage of development and hence at the wrong side of the Kuznets curve; (ii) 
there were high barriers to interregional trade thus barring convergence over time; and (iii) the 
central government’s regional policies and the intergovernmental transfer system serve to 
exacerbate inequality.  Pakistan (with inequality comparable to the US and Canada), by contrast, 
has a very low level of regional inequality. This, they argue, is largely due to the concentration of 
Pakistan’s population in its two largest provinces.  Measured this way, inequality in Pakistan would 
manifest itself as interpersonal, and not spatial. 
Mexico (with inequality five times that of the US) has a high, but stable, level of regional 
inequality. This is blamed partly on the centralized nature of the Mexican state, especially regional 
governments’ reliance on central government transfers.  Brazil (with inequality three to four times 
that of the US) has shown considerable variation in its level of spatial inequality over time. And 
Russia has seen a dramatic increase in it’s level of regional inequality. This could be explained by 
the major economic and political change it has undergone. 
For unitary countries they find that smaller cases, such as Romania, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan 
and Chile, have shown a reduction over time in levels of inequality.  Sri Lanka, with the lowest 
level of spatial inequality amongst the centralized countries they study, is more unequal than India.  
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This inequality can be explained by a low level of infrastructural development in poor regions, the 
concentration of industry around ports, and a decline in agriculture can explain. Larger unitary 
countries have substantially higher levels of regional inequality than comparable federal countries, 
such as China, Indonesia and Thailand. 
Shankar and Shah’s overall conclusion is that federal countries do better for three reasons: 
1. Regional inequality posses a greater political risk in federal countries. 
2. National political parties have to compete in multiple regions, making it infeasible to 
neglect regions.  
3. Regional governments are more accountable to their local electorates, and so pursue 
policies that are more developmental. 
Curiously, we now find ourselves in the opposite situation from section 3 above.  The 
predictions of theory about decentralization’s effects on inequality are ambiguous, but the evidence 
appears to be clearer: more decentralization and fiscal federalism are associated with lower levels of 
inequality.  But we must admit that the empirical basis for such an assertion is unsatisfyingly weak 
– one (admittedly broad) cross-country study.  Such evidence is subject to the same criticisms 
leveled in section 3 above, and hence to a similar solution.  Ultimately, the best way to research the 
effects of decentralization on inequality is through detailed case study, where processes of policy 
reform (i.e. cause) can be identified, and their effects on inequality traced in detail.  For this reason, 
we turn to the remarkable case of decentralization in Bolivia. 
Case Study: Bolivia 
 Bolivia entered the 1990s with a highly centralized state apparatus, the legacy of the 1952-
53 revolution which nationalized the “commanding heights” of the economy and concentrated state 
power in the hands of reformers in La Paz who sought to smash the economic power of the mining 
and landowning elites, and remake social relations throughout the country (Klein 1993).  The 
insurgents of 1952 succeeded in revolutionizing Bolivia’s economy, and in freeing the country’s 
large indigenous majority from the political and legal oppression they endured.  But they were less 
successful in changing social relations, and so real economic and political power remained in the 
hands of a small, largely white and mixed-race urban elite, at the expense of the indigenous, rural 
and peri-urban majority.  Hence at the advent of decentralization, Bolivia continued to be a country 
marked by high levels of interpersonal and spatial inequality. 
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Popular participation in Bolivia 
Decentralization was announced to an unsuspecting nation in January 1994.  The scale of 
the change in resource flows and political power that it brought about were enormous.  The core of 
the law consists of four points (Secretaría Nacional de Participación Popular, 1994). 
The Bolivian Decentralization Reform 
1. Resource Allocation.  Funds devolved to municipalities doubled to 20 percent of all national 
tax revenue.  More importantly, allocation amongst municipalities switched from unsystematic, 
highly political criteria to a strict per capita basis. 
2. Responsibility for Public Services.  Ownership of local infrastructure in education, health, 
irrigation, roads, sports and culture was given to municipalities, with the concomitant 
responsibility to maintain, equip and administer these facilities, and invest in new ones. 
3. Oversight Committees (Comités de Vigilancia) were established to provide an alternative 
channel for representing popular demand in the policy-making process. Composed of 
representatives from local, grass-roots groups, these bodies propose projects and oversee 
municipal expenditure.  Their ability to have disbursements of Popular Participation funds 
suspended if they find funds are being misused or stolen can paralyze local government, and 
gives them real power. 
4. Municipalization.  Existing municipalities were expanded to include suburbs and surrounding 
rural areas, and 198 new municipalities (out of some 315 in all) were created. 
This was followed by the Law of Decentralized Administration (1995) and the Law of 
Municipalities (1999), which  further defined the municipal mandate and located it in a broader 
governmental architecture. 
 The change in local affairs that these measures catalyzed was immense.  Before reform local 
government was absent throughout the vast majority of Bolivian territory, and the broader state 
present at most in the form of a military garrison, schoolhouse or health post, each reporting to its 
respective ministry.  After reform, elected local governments sprouted throughout the land. 
The Impact of Decentralization in Bolivia 
The extent of the change is perhaps best appreciated by examining the changes in resource 
flows decentralization catalyzed. Before decentralization, 308 Bolivian municipalities divided 
amongst them a mere 14 per cent of all centrally devolved funds, while the three main cities took 86 
per cent. After decentralization the shares reversed to 73 per cent and 27 per cent respectively. The 
per capita criterion resulted in a massive shift of resources away from the richest, most developed 
urban centers. Amongst smaller, poorer rural districts, resource increases of 50,000 – 100,000 per 
cent were quite common. 
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 A more important change was to the geographic distribution of resources amongst 
Bolivia’s municipalities before and after decentralization. We compare central(-only) investment in 
1991-1993 with local(-only) investment in 1994-1996. Figures 9-11 show total investment per 
capita in all Bolivia’s municipalities, where each municipality is a dot. An equitable distribution of 
investment would appear as a narrow band of points. What do the data show?  Figure 3 shows that 
per capita investment before decentralization was indeed highly unequal, with large investments in 
three districts and the vast majority at or near zero. Figure 10 corrects for the skewing effect of the 
highest observations by excluding the upper 12, allowing us to expand the vertical axis and see 
more detail. Though the distribution now appears less unequal, the density of dots increases steadily 
as we move downwards. Fully one-half of all observations lie on the horizontal axis. These 
municipalities received nothing. Closer examination reveals that these are disproportionately 
Bolivia’s small, poor, rural districts. 
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Figure 10: 
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Investment under centralized government was thus hugely skewed in favor of a few 
municipalities that received enormous sums, a second group where investment was significant, and 
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the unfortunate half of districts which received nothing. Compare this to figure 11, which shows 
municipal investment after decentralization. This chart shows no district over Bs.700/capita, a broad 
band with greatest density between Bs.100-200/capita, and only a few points touching the axis. 
Average municipal investment for this period is Bs.208/capita, and thus the band contains the 
mean10.  These crude indicators imply that decentralized government distributed public investment 
much more evenly than centralized government. Equality in per-capita terms is, of course, largely a 
result of the design of the reform, as noted in section 2.1, point 1. The ex-post result is thus not as 
surprising as the ex-ante one: central government, with a much larger budget and free rein over all 
of Bolivia’s municipalities, consistently chose a highly unequal distribution of investment across 
space. We return to this point in lesson six below. 
Figure 11 
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Source: National Secretariat of Public Investment and External Finance; original calculations. 
 
 Did these changes of allocation across space lead to any deeper changes in the quality of 
public investment?  Ideally we would investigate such a question by comparing quality-adjusted 
units of public outputs before and after decentralization. But such information is unfortunately not 
available for Bolivia (nor, indeed, for most countries). But we can investigate a related question, 
regarding decentralization’s effects on the responsiveness of public investment to local needs. As 
noted above, improved responsiveness to local citizens is one of the central – and most disputed – 
arguments in favor of decentralization, and hence any evidence in this respect is of particular 
interest. 
 Figure 12 shows scatter plots of central government investment (left-hand side graphs) vs. 
local government investment (right-hand side graphs) in education, agriculture, water and 
sanitation, and urban development. The graphs plot central government investment during the last 
                                                 
10 Investment sums here are much lower because they exclude central government funds. 
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three years before decentralization vs. local government investment during the first three years after 
decentralization, against objective indicators of real local need in each municipality. Each graph 
includes a regression line summarizing the overall relationship. 
The first comparison shows that central education investment fell as the illiteracy rate rose, 
meaning central government chose to concentrate education resources where literacy was higher. 
This is the opposite of what we would expect if central government were investing in areas of 
greatest need. After decentralization, by contrast, local governments invested progressively more 
where illiteracy was higher. Both regression lines are statistically significant – at the 5 per cent and 
0.1 per cent levels respectively. Note how many municipalities received no education investment at 
all under centralized rule. The following two graphs show a similar pattern for agriculture. Central 
government invested less where malnutrition rates were higher, whereas local governments invested 
more where malnutrition was higher. Both of these regression lines are significant at the 5 per cent 
level. The pattern is similar, though less dramatic, for water and sanitation, and urban 
development11.  In both sectors, strong tendencies to concentrate investment where it was least 
needed were reversed with decentralization, although in both cases local governments’ 
progressiveness is weak and statistically not significant. But even if we assume both decentralized 
regression lines have a slope of zero, this marks a significant change from central investment that 
increased where need was lower. 
                                                 
11 Note that the x-axis is reversed for urban development, for comparability. This is because the dependent variable used 
here is a positive, and not negative, concept. 
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Figure 12 
Central Gov’t Investment, by Municipality Local Gov’t Investment, by Municipality 
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Sources: National Institute of Statistics, National Secretariat of Popular Participation, National Secretariat of Public Investment 
and External Finance; original calculations. 
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 These graphs imply that decentralization increased government responsiveness to real local 
needs. After 1994, investment in education, agriculture, and water and sanitation was higher where 
illiteracy rates, malnutrition rates, and sewerage non-connection rates were higher; and urban 
development investment was higher in places where public infrastructure such as marketplaces was 
more scarce. That is to say, although median investment in these sectors increased throughout 
Bolivia after decentralization, the increases were even higher in those districts where the objective 
need for such services was greatest. 
Thus decentralization served to re-orient public investment from a regressive pattern of 
systematically favoring better-off municipalities, and thus increasing already-high levels of spatial 
inequality, to one that favored poorer, worse-provided municipalities, and thus decreased inequality. 
It is notable that these changes were driven by the actions of Bolivia’s 250 smallest, poorest, mostly 
rural municipalities investing newly devolved public funds in their highest-priority projects. This 
evidence supports the findings of Faguet (2004), which investigates a similar question. 
What explains such dramatic results? Decentralization creates new political ‘objects’ – in 
the case of Bolivia, new municipalities.  When these ‘objects’ are suited to the geographic level at 
which inequality occurs within a country, decentralization can unleash powerful forces that tend to 
counteract inequality.  This occurs via the creation of political identities, and the unleashing of 
competition around these for control of administrative authorities that are accountable to the 
residents of these new political units. 
Put another way, the fundamental question is not one of economic theory – where the logic 
whereby decentralization increases inequality is clear – but rather of political economy.  
Centralization places powerful equalizing tools in the hands of central-government politicians, but 
too often removes their incentives to use them properly.  Where a country’s inequality favors urban 
areas in which central government is physically concentrated, and powerful interest groups with a 
disproportionate influence over policy making, what exactly is a politician’s incentive to help 
worse-off regions?  In such a situation, inequality will not only persist but flourish, as the 
admittedly powerful anti-inequality fiscal tools at central government’s disposal lay dormant, or 
worse. 
Decentralization changes this calculus in fundamental ways.  It places power in the hands of 
those with most to gain from unmaking the inequality that afflicts a country.  And it allows them to 
choose local authorities endowed with the authority and resources to take corrective action.  So long 
as local politics are reasonably transparent and not captured by elites – admittedly a big ‘if’ – local 
authorities will have much stronger incentives than central officials have to invest in the types of 
services and infrastructure that promote local development.  And by allowing municipalities the 
freedom to experiment with different policies, decentralization generates strong incentives for 
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policy innovation, and then for learning from those experiments that prove successful.  Taken as a 
whole, a decentralized system of policy making and fiscal relations has the potential to generate 
strong equalizing tendencies in public investment and economic growth.  And in Bolivia it did. 
8. Conclusion 
Latin America suffers high levels of inequality.  This is a significant problem in its own 
right, blighting the lives of millions of Latin Americans and holding back economic growth and 
technological progress in the region.  Economic theory predicts that fiscal policy should provide 
many of the answers required to solve problems of inequality.  But empirical evidence from the 
region – and indeed from all over the world – is less encouraging.  In practice, fiscal policy often 
seems to have no effects.  And occasionally, policy tools that should lessen inequality instead 
worsen it.  Why is this so? 
The problem, as we discuss above, is not that the fiscal tools themselves are flawed, or that 
the theory about their effectiveness is wrong.  There are enough cases of success to establish that 
fiscal policy is capable of operating as intended.  The problem, rather, is that fiscal tools are often 
poorly implemented, or even mis-used, and hence do not achieve the results that economic theory 
would predict.  In the political economy of policy selection and implementation, when a given tool 
with predictable outcomes is deployed in an unexpected way, the outcomes achieved can be 
unpredictable or even perverse.  Inefficiencies and distortions in the allocation and use of public 
resources cripple their effectiveness, and fundamentally alter the outcomes that should be achieved.  
This appears to explain the numerous cases where fiscal policy has effects on spatial inequality that 
are negligible or even counterproductive. 
We see this at work in Mexico, Brazil and Bolivia, where until very recently most of the 
attempts to combat inequality using fiscal policy went awry because programs became politicized 
(especially in Mexico) or captured, and resources were wasted.  But our three case studies also 
provide strong examples of successful policy reforms that strongly combat inequality.  The first of 
these is shared by Mexico and Brazil: fiscal policies that explicitly target poverty indices in simple 
ways can work, so long as the targeting is transparent, and the goods or services in question can be 
branded so strongly as pro-poor that they become, in effect, stigmatized for the rest of the 
population.  Oportunidades & FAIS in Mexico, Bolsa Familia in Brazil, and TRABAJAR and Plan 
Jefas y Jefes de Hogar in Argentina are all examples of this logic at work.  The helps solve the 
problem of “benefit leakage”, a constant threat for anti-poverty policies.  Implementing such 
targeting techniques can greatly increase the efficiency and effectiveness of anti-inequality 
programs, as occurred in both countries, with impressive initial results. 
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A second lesson is that many of the fiscal policies discussed above that do not work seem 
well designed, and may even have worked during an initial period.  Most of the measures tried in 
Mexico fall into this category.  Their subsequent cooptation or deformation by interest groups and 
regional elites is not necessarily a flaw of the policy tools per se, but rather a problem of the 
incentives that central authorities face.  Patronage, favoritism, and corruption are systematic 
problems faced by public authorities the world over.  To the extent that such authorities are more 
powerful, and operate in a context with fewer external controls and less accountability, the 
pathologies expressed by the policy they make will be more severe. 
A third proto-lesson, surprisingly, concerns the equalizing effects of universally provided 
social services, and is inspired by the case of Argentina.  In opposition to targeted benefits aimed at 
the poor, universal services work through two effects and not one.  They of course raise the floor in 
terms of service provision for poor individuals and regions.  But they also lower the ceiling by 
discouraging the development of a fee-paying private sector into which the rich can escape from the 
public system.  It is unclear what aggregate effects such a policy change would have on the overall 
health or education of a nation.  But where inequality is concerned, the effects should be 
unambiguously equalizing.  We term this a proto-lesson because the empirical evidence provided 
here is no more than vaguely suggestive.  But the possibility is sufficiently interesting that it merits 
further study. 
 Decentralization provides a second set of solutions to such problems of the mis-application 
of fiscal policy tools.  It operates by reducing the discretion and power of central government 
authorities, and increasing the oversight and accountability faced by those to whom such power is 
transferred – local authorities.  In other words, decentralization changes the incentives that those 
charged with public power and resources face.  Not surprisingly, the behavior of public authorities 
then changes as well.  Decentralization works because it creates political objects that operate at the 
level at which spatial inequality operates. These comprise political units, political identities and a 
competitive dynamic that operate so as to reward political agents who expose regressive policies, 
and work to deliver resources to backwards regions.  Such a set of institutions can reliably and 
effectively decrease inequality over time.  This is what we see in Bolivia. 
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